| SES # | TOPICS | KEY DATES |
|---|---|---|
| Part I. Themes: Theory Causal Tests, Evidence, and a First Application | ||
| 1 | Minimum wages and employment: Theory says? | |
| 2 |
Testing theory: The fundamental problem of causal evidence The method of Differences in Differences |
|
| 3 | Minimum wages and employment: Evidence | |
| Part II. The Foundation of Everything: Consumer Preference, Choice, Optimization, and Demand | ||
| 4 | Introducing consumer theory: The foundation of microeconomics | |
| 5 | Consumer sovereignty: The Carte Blanche principle | Pset 1 due day after Session 5 |
| 6 | From preferences to demand curves | |
| 7 | Income effects, substitution effects, and the design of anti-poverty programs | |
| 8 | Income, substitution, and subsistence | Pset 2 due |
| 9 | Exam 1 | |
| Part III. From Consumer Demand to Market Demand | ||
| 10 | Applied competitive analysis: The U.S. sugar program | |
| 11 | Applied competitive analysis: The market for real estate brokers | |
| Part IV. Putting Markets Together: General Equilibrium, Exchange, and International Trade | ||
| 12 | Putting markets together: The Edgeworth box | |
| 13 | The gains from market integration: “The Digital Provide” | Pset 3 due day after Session 13 |
| 14 | International trade and comparative advantage | |
| 15 |
Does trade raise national income? The method of Instrumental Variables |
|
| 16 | The free trade dilemma | |
| Part V. Markets Are Not Perfect: Externalities | ||
| 17 |
Externalities: Definition, consequences, and remedies Guest lecture: Colin Gray or Christina Patterson, Graduate students at MIT’s Department of Economics |
|
| 18 | Internalizing externalities: Barbed wire fencing | Pset 4 due day after Session 18 |
| 19 | Prediction is difficult, especially about the future: Choice under uncertainty. | |
| 20 | Exam 2 | |
| Part VI. Choice Under Uncertainty: Risk Preference, the Value of Safety, and the Market for Risk | ||
| 21 | Risk preference, the value of time, and the value of statistical life | |
| 22 | There’s a market for risk? How insurance works | |
| 23 |
Moral hazard in the housing market: Subprime lending The Regression Discontinuity method |
|
| Part VII. Markets are Not Perfect: TMI or NEMI? | ||
| 24 | Imperfect information: Signaling in markets | Pset 5 due day after Session 24 |
| 25 | Why do educated people earn more? Signaling vs. human capital | |
| 26 | Mandating a pooling equilibrium: “Ban the Box” legislation | Pset 6 due day after Session 26 |
| 27 | Adverse selection and the Lemons Problem | |
| 28 | Health insurance in practice: Why it works, why it matters | |
| Exam 3 (during exam period) | ||
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2016
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